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학술지 An Enhanced (t,n) Threshold Directed Signature Scheme
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저자
황정연, 김형중, 이동훈, 송보연
발행일
201408
출처
Information Sciences, v.275, pp.284-292
ISSN
0020-0255
출판사
Elsevier
DOI
https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ins.2014.02.038
협약과제
14NS5200, 미래 복합 컴퓨팅 환경에서의 데이터 프라이버시 강화 기술 개발, 장구영
초록
A directed signature scheme is devised to achieve directivity for verification such that only a designated verifier can check the validity of a signature and, in times of trouble, any third party can verify the signature with the help of the signer or the designated verifier. A threshold directed signature scheme distributes responsibility and authority for generating a directed signature to several users via a threshold mechanism. Lu et al. recently proposed a novel (t,n) threshold directed signature scheme. In this paper, we show that the scheme is vulnerable to a rogue-key attack which is mounted by an adversary who can arbitrarily select his or her public key. Through the rogue-key attack, the adversary can forge a signature on any message for a set of signers. In order to thwart such a rogue-key attack, we propose an enhanced (t,n) threshold directed signature scheme with a reliable key registration protocol. The protocol guarantees that a user should have access to the secret key corresponding to the user's public key. Under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, we prove that the improved scheme is secure, that is, it achieves existential unforgeability under the chosen message attack, invisibility, and transitivity in the registered key model. We stress that the security of our improved scheme does not depend on a specific broadcast channel for synchronous message transmission. © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
키워드
Designated verifier, Directed signature, Forgery, Rogue-key attack, Threshold
KSP 제안 키워드
Broadcast Channel, Designated verifier, Directed signature, Improved scheme, Public Key, Rogue-key attack, Signature scheme, Third party, computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, existential unforgeability, message transmission