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학술대회
A DPA Countermeasure by Randomized Frobenius Decomposition
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- 발행일
- 200508
- 출처
- International Workshop on Information Security Applications (WISA) 2005 (LNCS 3786), v.3786, pp.271-282
- 협약과제
- 05MK2500, 차세대 시큐리티 기술 개발, 조현숙
- 초록
- There have been various methods to prevent DPA (Differential Power Analysis) on elliptic curve cryptosystems. As for the curves with efficient endomorphisms, Hasan suggested several countermeasures on anomalous binary curves, and Ciet, Quisquater and Sica proposed a countermeasure on GLV curves. Ciet et al.'s method is based on random decomposition of a scalar, and it is a two-dimensional generalization of Coron's method. Hasan's and Ciet et al.'s countermeasures are applied only to a small class of elliptic curves. In this paper, we enlarge the class of DPA-resistant curves by proposing a DPA countermeasure applicable to any curve where the Frobenius expansion method can be used. Our analysis shows that our countermeasure can produce a probability of collision around script O sign(2-20) with only 15.4-34.0% extra computation for scalar multiplications on various practical settings. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006.
- KSP 제안 키워드
- Differential Power Analysis, Elliptic curve cryptosystems, Elliptic curves, probability of collision, two-dimensional(2D)